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Highlights
 We investigate the interrelationship between financial openness, bank risk and bank profit 
efficiency
 Estimation is based on data for 2,007 commercial banks in 140 countries over the period 1999-
2011
 Financial openness reduces bank profit efficiency directly,  and increases bank risk indirectly 
through decreased profit efficiency
 A battery of robustness tests corroborate the validity of the results
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ABSTRACT
This paper assesses the interrelationship between financial openness, bank risk and bank 
profit efficiency using a cross-country sample of 2,007 commercial banks covering 140 
countries over the period 1999-2011. To establish whether the impact of financial openness 
on both bank risk and profit efficiency occurs directly or through each one of the two bank 
characteristics (efficiency and risk, respectively), we begin our analysis by investigating the 
potential reverse Granger causality between profit efficiency and risk using a dynamic 
simultaneous model via system GMM estimation. We then account explicitly for the role of 
bank risk in the estimation of bank profit efficiency using stochastic frontier analysis, 
allowing for the influence of different measures of financial openness and risk alongside 
other control variables. Our results indicate that financial openness reduces bank profit 
efficiency directly, not through changes in bank risk. We also find that financial openness 
increases bank risk indirectly, through the decreased bank profit efficiency channel. 
JEL Classification: G21; F36; C23; C24
Keywords: Financial openness; Risk; Bank efficiency; Stochastic Frontier Analysis; Granger 
causality
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1.   Introduction  
Since the 1980s the global capital market has become increasingly interdependent 
owing to increased cross-border capital mobility among countries. Both developed and 
developing countries have thus embarked on the liberalization of their capital accounts, 
allowing foreign ownership of domestic resources, including equity (financial openness). 
This process gained further impetus in the 1990s as a result of the IMF and World Bank led 
reform programmes which embraced the Washington Consensus.
The initial stimulus behind the drive for financial liberalization was its postulated link 
with economic growth, stemming from the seminal contributions of McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973). In broad terms, the finance-growth nexus works through the efficiency of the 
financial intermediation process which makes for a better allocation of financial resources, in 
turn promoting investment and economic growth. 
The prospect of benefits to be gained from financial development led to widespread 
deregulatory reforms with many countries allowing banks to be foreign-owned and inviting 
foreign entry of banks on a national treatment basis (Claessens et al., 2001). As part of this 
process of liberalization, deregulation and greater global financial integration, banks 
worldwide expanded their services abroad and engaged in greater risk taking while at the 
same time adapting to the changing social and economic environment in order improve their 
productive efficiency (Denizer et al., 2007). Heightened competition brought about by greater 
financial openness and freedom of markets also placed a strong emphasis on banks to 
improve their efficiency by adjusting their risk-return profiles.
In this paper, we revisit empirically the influence of financial openness on bank profit 
efficiency but we do so by accounting explicitly for the role played by bank risk in this 
relationship. Although various individual links among these three variables have already been 
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analyzed in previous literature, few studies have considered the three variables jointly in an 
international sample of bank-level data.
At the theoretical level, several propositions exist in the literature with regard to both 
direct and indirect effects, positive as well as negative, of financial openness on bank profit 
efficiency, as well as the role that bank risk may play in relation to each of the above 
variables. 
The first, positive and direct effect of financial openness on bank profit efficiency 
stems from the well-established, though arguably controversial, theoretical premise that 
opening up the economy to foreign capital provides banks with greater possibilities for 
enhanced capital allocation to productive investments, also as a result of a higher propensity 
to channel funds toward higher expected return projects (see, e.g., Obstfeld, 1994; Levine, 
1997).1  
The above premise (and related supporting evidence) forms the cornerstone of the free 
market view, a view that stands opposite to that purported by those who advocate more 
regulated markets because financial openness can also generate significant economic costs 
and have a direct negative impact on efficiency. For example, Agénor (2003) posited that 
entry by foreign banks may, as a result of their credit rationing strategies (on firms and, to a 
lesser extent, households), have a negative impact on the expected increase in efficiency in 
the financial sector. He also postulated that financial openness can create pressures on local 
banks (which tend to have lower operational costs) to merge in order to remain competitive. 
The resulting market concentration (which could also arise as foreign banks acquire local 
banks) could create monopoly power that would reduce the overall efficiency of the banking 
                                                          
1 Furthermore, the availability of foreign capital and/or greater foreign bank presence may increase 
the profit efficiency of banks through better financial intermediation, economies of scale and scope, 
and reduced transaction-, overhead- and information-costs (see, e.g., Levine, 2001).
Page 6 of 60
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
`
6
system. Moreover, bank consolidation and restructuring driven by the freedom of markets 
could further undermine the efficacy of corporate control and management best practice, 
which may in turn adversely affect bank profits. Nevertheless, whether the direct effect of 
financial openness on bank profit efficiency is positive or negative remains an empirical 
question, which has yet to be satisfactorily squared by the applied literature.
Possible reasons why previous findings are mixed and hence ambiguous may be due 
to the failure to incorporate in the analysis of the above relationship the simultaneous role 
that bank risk may play as a conduit for an additional, indirect influence of financial openness 
on bank profit efficiency, and its potential reverse causality with the latter since it is equally 
possible that financial openness might affect bank risk via its impact on bank profit 
efficiency.2
The indirect effect of financial openness on bank profit efficiency that operates 
through bank risk could also be positive or negative. A portfolio management theory 
perspective would suggest a positive impact, particularly for larger banks, warranted by new 
opportunities for risk spreading and international portfolio diversification in terms of both 
income and asset diversity (see, e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2007). Conversely, 
the indirect effect through the risk channel could be negative given the new opportunities for 
banks to incur more risks under a more liberalized and deregulated financial regime as banks 
expand their operations into foreign markets or in non-traditional activities (see Cubillas and 
González, 2014).  Higher bank risk and risk taking may, in turn, undermine efficiency gains 
from financial openness (see Dailami, 2009). These considerations should suffice in making 
it at least plausible to hypothesize the existence of an additional indirect – positive or 
                                                          
2 Indeed, a number of studies have examined the trade-offs between bank efficiency and risk using 
Granger causality techniques (see, e.g., Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Williams, 2004; Fiordelisi et al., 
2011). 
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negative – effect running from financial openness to bank profit efficiency that may operate 
via bank risk; the determination of the prevailing net effect remaining a task for empirical 
estimation. 
To the best of our knowledge, no single study has examined the importance of bank 
risk in investigating the effect of financial openness on bank profit efficiency, nor the impact 
of financial openness on both bank risk and profit efficiency by distinguishing between its 
direct influence and the effect that occurs through each one of the two bank characteristics 
(efficiency and risk, respectively). This paper makes a fresh contribution in these directions. 
Accordingly, using a sample of 2,007 commercial banks operating in 140 countries 
over the period 1999-2011, the analysis will cater for these investigative routes as follows. 
Given that bank profit efficiency may be directly affected by financial openness, or indirectly 
through changes in bank risk levels, and since bank profit efficiency may also be a factor 
affecting bank risk, the analysis starts by using dynamic simultaneous models on both profit 
efficiency and bank risk with financial openness as an explanatory variable via system GMM 
estimations that also allow us to address the reverse causality between bank risk and profit 
efficiency. Then, to assess the sensitivity of our results, we estimate profit efficiency using 
stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) that allows estimates of efficiency to be influenced directly 
by a number of variables including different measures of risk and financial openness. Since 
country-specific differences in institutional factors and regulations may affect the role and 
relevance of bank risk in influencing bank profit efficiency under a more globally integrated 
financial environment, and given that this influence may vary with the state of economic 
development, we also control for country-specific differences in the regulatory environment 
and other factors, and conduct a battery of robustness tests. 
The main results show that financial openness reduces bank profit efficiency directly, 
not through the channel of bank risk. Significantly, we also show that financial openness 
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increases bank risk indirectly, through the decreased bank profit efficiency, a result that has 
not yet been reported in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief theoretical 
background and discusses previous literature. Section 3 describes the methodology and data. 
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. A review of related literature  
As anticipated in our introduction, opening up the economy to foreign capital flows 
and relaxing entry barriers into the banking sector are expected to promote greater financial 
development and stimulate domestic competition. In this process banks too may accrue 
efficiency gains, directly or indirectly, as a result of more possibilities to allocate resources to 
productive investments, improved risk diversification and management best practice, reduced 
transaction, overhead and information costs, and new financial instruments and services 
(Claessens et al., 2001; Hermes and Lensink, 2008; Levine, 2001; Laeven and Levine, 2007; 
Herwartz and Walle, 2014). Yet, as noted earlier, the empirical evidence on the impact of 
financial liberalization/openness on bank efficiency is mixed, with many studies reporting a 
negative effect. Most of the applied studies relating to profit, cost or technical efficiency are 
conducted for individual countries with relatively few offering regional or cross-country level 
coverage.
Among country-specific studies, Williams and Intarachote (2003) investigate the 
impact of financial liberalization on the profit efficiency of Thai banks and find that bank 
profit efficiency decreases during the deregulation period. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy 
(2005) investigate the effects of financial liberalization on bank cost and profit efficiency in 
Pakistan and find that while profit efficiency improved immediately after liberalization, the 
efficiency improvement did not continue in subsequent years.  Using a dataset of Turkish 
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banks, Denizer et al. (2007) too find that banking efficiency declined after financial 
liberalization owing to serious scale and macroeconomic problems. 
Among region-specific studies, Hermes and Nhung (2010) investigate the impact of 
financial liberalization on Latin American and Asian banks over the period 1991-2000. Their 
results indicate a positive effect on bank efficiency. Other studies focus specifically on the 
impact of privatization or foreign ownership on bank efficiency. For example, Williams and 
Nguyen (2005) study the impact of commercial bank ownership resulting from liberalization 
on bank profit efficiency, technical change and productivity in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand, during the period 1990-2003. Their findings suggest that 
privatization policies encouraged improvements in bank efficiency and productivity over the 
deregulation period. Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) analyze the profit and cost efficiency in 
the transition economies following privatization and find that foreign-owned banks are more 
cost efficient, but less profit efficient, than domestic state-owned banks.  Other related 
research on bank efficiency has considered the effects of banking and/or financial sector 
reforms as part of economic restructuring and liberalization in transition economies (e.g., 
Fries and Taci, 2005; Bonin et al., 2005; Brissimis et al., 2008) and, more recently, of the 
impact of greater economic and financial freedom in European Union member states 
(Chortareas et al., 2013, Mamatzakis et al., 2013).  The main conclusion to be drawn from 
this strand of research is that greater freedom of banks in their operations has led to 
enhancements in overall efficiency levels particularly in environments where institutional 
reforms and governance requirements are strong.  
At a broader cross-country level, Claessens et al. (2001) examined the extent and 
effect of foreign presence in domestic banking markets using 7,900 bank observations from 
80 countries for the period 1988–1995. They found that the increased presence of foreign 
banks is associated with a reduction in profitability and margins for domestic banks. Lensink 
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et al. (2008) examine whether the efficiency of foreign banks depends on the institutional 
quality of the host country and on institutional differences between the home and host 
country. Using SFA for a sample of 2,095 commercial banks in 105 countries over 1998-
2003, they find that foreign ownership negatively affects bank efficiency. However, in 
countries with good governance this negative effect is less pronounced. Additionally, their 
results suggest that higher quality of home country institutions and higher similarity between 
home and host country institutional quality reduce foreign bank inefficiency.  Hermes and 
Meesters (2015) examine the impact of financial liberalization on bank cost efficiency using 
a multi-country sample of banks covering 61 countries for the period 1996-2005. Employing 
a range of domestic and international liberalization measures, they report a positive 
association between financial liberalization and increased bank efficiency that hinges upon 
the quality of bank regulation and supervision. The impact of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework on bank efficiency is examined by Pasiouras et al. (2009) and Lozano-Vivas and 
Pasiouras (2010) who find that regulations and incentives that promote private monitoring 
and strengthen authorities’ supervisory power affect both cost and profit efficiency positively, 
while restrictions on banks’ activities improve profit efficiency but reduce cost efficiency.
Another strand of literature has concentrated on the link between financial 
liberalization and the likelihood of banking crises due to greater levels of risk taken by banks 
(Angkinand et al., 2010; Daniel and Jones, 2007; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Mehrez and Kaufmann, 2000). One potential channel through 
which liberalization affects bank risk-taking is via higher bank competition. Here, the effect 
can be positive or negative depending on whether the “competition-fragility” or the 
“competition-stability” force prevails. In the former case, higher competition erodes banks’ 
charter value and undermines prudent behavior thus increasing banks’ incentives for risk-
taking (see, e.g., Keeley, 1990; and Hellmann et al., 2000). In the latter case (“competition-
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stability”), greater bank competition reduces bank risk as banks charge lower interest rates, 
which diminishes their incentives to move into riskier projects (see Boyd and De Nicolo, 
2005; Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009). Using an international sample of over 4,000 banks in 83 
countries, Cubillas and González (2014) find that bank risk increases with financial 
liberalization via stronger bank competition in developed countries, whereas in developing 
countries higher risk results from expanding opportunities to undertake riskier investments. 
Another channel through which financial liberalization affects risk-taking is via 
increased opportunities for banks to diversify into foreign markets or in non-traditional 
activities. In a recent paper, Berger et al. (2015) distinguish between a diversification 
hypothesis and a market risk hypothesis in their analysis of the relationship between bank 
internationalization and risk. The former hypothesis implies that banks sustain lower risk as 
they diversify their portfolios internationally, while the latter suggests that banks face higher 
risk when operating abroad owing to market specific factors which make their foreign assets 
relatively risky.  Gulamhussen et al. (2014) emphasize the complexity of the relationship 
between bank internationalization and risk, with potential risk-reducing gains from portfolio 
diversification to be potentially offset by incentives leading banks to take on excessive risks. 
They study such a relationship on an international sample of 384 listed banks from 56 
countries, for the period 2001-2007, and find robust evidence that international 
diversification increases bank risk.  Their evidence is consistent with the market risk 
hypothesis that Berger et al. (2015) support in their empirical analysis of a large sample of 
US banks over the period 1989-2010.   
Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014a) examine the evolution of credit risk co-
dependence in the banking sectors of over 65 countries. They find that there has been a 
significant increase in default risk co-dependence over the 3-year period preceding the 
financial crisis. Significantly, they also show that countries that are more integrated with 
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liberalized financial systems have experienced greater banking sector co-dependence. 
However, they highlight that this detrimental effect of financial openness is alleviated by a 
strong institutional environment that allows for efficient public and private monitoring of 
financial institutions.
The literature reviewed so far deals with the general link between financial 
liberalization and/or openness and bank efficiency, or bank risk and bank risk-taking, 
respectively. Given our interest, a third strand of the literature that has investigated the 
relationship between bank risk and bank efficiency also requires coverage. 
Berger and DeYoung (1997) introduce four hypotheses to formalise the relationship 
between credit risk and bank efficiency: (i) the “bad management” hypothesis; (ii) the 
“skimping” hypothesis; (iii) the “bad luck” hypothesis; and (iv) the “moral hazard” 
hypothesis. Significantly, they also provide evidence that risk negatively influences cost 
efficiency among bankrupt banks. Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) find a negative relationship 
between risk-taking behaviour and efficiency among financial institutions. However, Hughes 
and Mester (1993) suggest that risk-averse managers are more likely to lend higher quality 
loans, but the costs might be increased for monitoring of loan performance, hence lowering 
cost efficiency. Altunbas et al. (2007) investigate the efficiency of banks in European 
countries from 1992 to 2000 and fail to find a strong relationship between bank inefficiency 
and risk-taking behaviour. Hughes and Mester (2008) survey the literature on the relationship 
between efficiency, risk and asset quality in the banking sector. Their cogent synthesis 
concludes that the quality of equity capital influences the insolvency risk of banks. More 
recently, using DEA techniques and a Tobin regression approach, Chan et al. (2014) analyze 
the effects of off-balance sheet (OBS) activities and various types of risk on the cost and 
profit efficiency of banks in seven East Asian countries for the period 2001-2008. Their 
results show that a Z-score measure of bank insolvency risk is positively related to profit 
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efficiency, while interest sensitivity, size, equity to total assets and OBS exposures all impact 
on cost efficiency. The analysis of the impact of input and output slacks reveals that in 20 
percent of cases banks’ cost efficiency can be improved by adjusting the former variables, 
whereas in only about one percent of cases a similar outcome is attainable for profit 
efficiency.
However, the literature has not been successful in establishing a conventional wisdom 
as to the precise patterns that may characterize a causal relationship between bank risk and 
efficiency in a setup which includes financial openness. In liberalized financial markets, 
international capital flows can amplify financial risks because of greater availability of capital 
which increases the funds intermediated by the financial sector thereby influencing the 
efficient operation of banks. Moreover, the potential for reverse causality adds to the 
complexity, consistent with a “skimping” hypothesis described by Berger and DeYoung 
(1997), in which there is a trade-off between short-term efficiency and future risk-taking due 
to moral hazard considerations. In their comprehensive assessment of the inter-temporal 
relationship between bank efficiency, capital and risk in a sample of European commercial 
banks, Fiordelisi et al. (2011) explain that banks might be tempted to increase revenues 
simply by taking on higher risk to compensate for lost returns. Using SFA and dynamic panel 
regressions with Granger causality tests, they conclude that lower bank efficiency with 
respect to costs and revenues Granger-causes higher bank risk (i.e., less efficient banks are 
more inclined to take on greater risk) and that increases in bank capital precede (in the 
temporal Granger-sense) cost efficiency improvements. 
In conclusion, taking stock of various strands of previous literature at both the 
theoretical and empirical level, would suggest that financial openness may impact both bank 
risk and profit efficiency directly, or indirectly through the effect that occurs through each of 
the two bank characteristics (efficiency and risk, respectively).  In the present study we add to 
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what has gone before by analysing within a single study and using a large panel of countries 
the significance, directionality and Granger causality of these intricate relationships 
empirically, so as to establish the effectiveness of financial openness in affecting bank risk 
and profit efficiency, and the channel through which such effects may occur.  
3.  Methodology, variables and data
3.1. Dynamic GMM estimation and Granger causality
We begin by considering an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) system to test for 
Granger-causality among the variables of interest. Specifically, building upon the work of 
Berger and DeYoung (1997), Williams (2004), Casu and Girardone (2009) and Fiordelisi et 
al. (2011), we use the dynamic panel GMM estimation of the following ARDL model:
where i denotes the cross-sectional dimension (the banks), t denotes time, RISK represents 
individual bank risk, PE denotes bank profit efficiency, FINOPEN denotes financial 
openness, and ,i t  is the random error term. The first equation tests whether changes in bank 
risk temporally precede variations in bank profit efficiency and the second equation tests 
whether changes in profit efficiency temporally precede variations in risk. The simultaneous 
estimation by GMM of the above equations allows us to account for potential endogeneity or 
simultaneity in the dynamics of bank risk and profit efficiency that may be jointly influenced 
by financial openness as well as the possibility of reserve causality between profit efficiency 
and risk. 
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In the empirical estimation, as in Casu and Girardone (2009) and Fiordelisi et al. 
(2011), we include two lags for the variables of interest (risk, efficiency and financial 
openness) and so estimate an AR(2) process. Testing whether one variable x Granger causes 
another variable y can be determined by a Wald test of the null hypothesis that the two lags of 
the causal variable x are jointly equal to zero.  The sum of the lagged coefficients of x
represents the ‘total effect’ of the causal relationship, the statistical significance of which also 
provides a (Wald) test of Granger-causality.3  Additionally, we assess the ‘long run’ effect of 
a change in x on y, determined from the estimated coefficients representing the dynamics of 
both x and y.4
Note that, since the dependent variable is a function of the error term, the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with the error term, making the OLS estimator biased and 
inconsistent. Hence, we apply the system generalized method of moments (SYS-GMM) 
estimation for the dynamic panel data model, as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
Blundell and Bond (1998), and employ the Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors.
3.2. Profit efficiency estimation
To determine bank profit efficiency scores and to investigate further the impact of 
financial openness and other control variables (including bank risk) on profit efficiency we 
follow the methodological approach of recent studies (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; 
Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013) by using SFA.  Here we consider the Battese and Coelli (1995)
model, which allows measurement of inefficiency from the best-practice frontier in a single-
step estimation which incorporates other factors including country- and bank-specific 
                                                          
3 If the p-value of the Wald test is less than 5% in either case, we reject the null hypothesis that x does 
not Granger-cause y at the 5% significance level.  
4 The ‘long-run’ effect is the partial derivative , based on the 
assumption, ceteris paribus, that the dynamic adjustment of a unit change in x on y is complete, where 
 and  represent the lag coefficients of x and y, respectively.     
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variables to influence directly the mean inefficiency of banks. This setup allows us to 
examine the impact of financial openness and risk on bank efficiency while controlling for 
other bank level and cross-country differences.  In its general form, the profit model can be 
written as:
,    i = 1,2,…,N;   t = 1,2,…,T         (1)
where  is pre-tax profits of bank i at time t;  refers to the vector of banks output 
prices;  is the vector of input prices;  is a vector of unknown scalar parameters that 
connect with output and input variables in the profit function;  is the random error 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed ;  is a non-negative 
random inefficiency term assumed to be independent but not identically distributed. The term 
 follows a truncated-normal distribution, with truncation (at zero) of the 
distribution where the mean is defined as:
                                                     (2)
where  is the vector of observable explanatory variables that might be considered as the 
inefficiency of bank i at time t, and  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. Following 
Battese and Coelli (1995), the coefficients of (1) and (2) are generally estimated in a single-
step using maximum likelihood. The specification of equation (1) follows the approach of 
Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) to estimate a standard profit frontier that is specified in terms 
of input prices and output prices.
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Choice of Inputs and Outputs
The selection of input and output variables for the profit frontier is based on the 
typical intermediation approach (e.g., Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013), which treats banks as 
financial intermediaries collecting funds (deposits) as inputs and transforming them into 
loans or other assets. We specify two output prices: (i) the ratio of interest revenue to loans 
(P1); and (ii) the ratio of non-interest revenue to other earning assets (P2). And three input 
prices: (i) the cost of ‘loanable’ funds (W1), estimated by the ratio of interest expense/total 
deposits; (ii) the cost of physical capital (W2), measured by overhead expenses net of 
personnel expenses/book value of fixed assets; and (iii) the cost of labour (W3), defined as 
personnel expenses/total assets. Moreover, equity (EQ) is included as a quasi-fixed input in 
the profit function to control for different levels of banks’ risk profile, as Berger and Mester 
(1997) suggest that failure to control for equity might lead to a scale bias in the estimation of 
inefficiency since equity is another source for loans. They explain that dividends paid do not 
take into account the overall cost, while the cost of raising equity is higher than raising 
deposits.
5
  Among the inputs, the third input (W3) is used to normalize the dependent 
variables and other input prices. In addition, a time trend (T=1 for 1999, T=2 for 2000, to T = 
13 for 2011) with both linear and quadratic terms (T and T2) is included to incorporate the 
effect of changes in technology over time. A dummy variable (DEVEL) is also included to 
distinguish between developed and developing countries, thus accounting for differences in 
their level of economic development. 
3.2.1. Empirical SFA model
                                                          
5 According to Hughes and Mester (2008), who cite Berger and Mester (1997) and Mester (1996), it is 
necessary to incorporate equity as a quasi-fixed input in the empirical model so that the shadow price 
of equity is measured. Other studies (e.g., Pasiouras et al., 2009; and Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 
2010) also incorporate this variable as a quasi-fixed input in their cost and profit efficiency models.
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We employ a multi-product translog function to estimate the profit efficiency of 
banks. The function is represented by a second-order Taylor expansion that is commonly 
employed in previous studies, since the translog functional form allows for greater flexibility 
when evaluating the efficiency frontier. Using the above input and output prices, the 
empirical profit function is specified as:
It should be noted that to account for the negative minimum profit of banks, since the 
dependent variable requires the natural logarithmic transformation, we follow the approach 
suggested by Bos and Koetter (2011) by incorporating an additional independent variable, the 
negative profit indicator (NPI). In this way, the dependent variable is assigned a value of 1 
when PBT ≤ 0; then, the additional independent variable (NPI) equals 1 when PBT ≥ 0 and 
equals the absolute value of PBT for banks with negative profits. A similar transformation is 
used by Tabak et al. (2011) and Gaganis and Pasiouras (2013) to estimate bank efficiency.6
                                                          
6 Some early studies (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997; Pasiouras et al., 2009) add a constant value to 
convert the non-positive value of profit before tax, the absolute value of minimum profit before tax 
plus one and add to original value: PBT+ (| PBTmin|+1). However, Bos and Kotter (2011) indicate that 
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3.2.2. Potential determinants of inefficiency
To investigate the determinants of inefficiency, in particular the impact of financial 
openness and risk on the mean inefficiency of banks, while at the same time controlling for 
other bank-level and country-level characteristics,  in equation (2) is given by:
where FINOPEN is a measure of financial openness, and RISK is the bank-level measure of 
risk. The other variables are included to control for country level differences in the regulatory 
environment (CAPR, SUP, PRIM, ACTR), market structure (CONC), financial development 
(CLAIM), macroeconomic conditions (GDPGR, INFA), banking crises (CRISIS), and the 
development dummy (DEVEL); as well as bank characteristics which include bank size 
(SIZE), business model asset diversification (ASSETDIV), and income diversification 
(INCMDIV). Additionally, we include year dummies (D01-D12) to control for time effects.  
3.3. Measures of financial openness
In our empirical analysis, we include several measures to account for the degree of 
financial openness across countries. First, we employ the de jure financial openness index 
(FINOPEN-Chinn-Ito) as constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008) to capture the effect of capital 
account liberalization across countries. Chinn and Ito (2008) have extended their earlier work 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
such a transformation might affect the error term (a critical issue in SFA) and might also omit the 
information for the truncated part of the distribution of the dependent variable, leading to misleading 
results.
Page 20 of 60
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
`
20
(Chinn and Ito, 2006) and updated their dataset annually using the information published in 
the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) 
with binary coding (restriction does not exist =1, otherwise = 0) of the information to 
calculate the openness index according to four categories: (1) the presence of multiple 
exchange rates; (2) restrictions on current account transactions; (3) restrictions on capital 
account transactions; (4) the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. The index is 
given the score 0-4 after transforming the binary variables into a quantitative scale, with a
higher value implying more openness of the capital account. This index covers a large 
number of countries (181 countries) from 1970 to 2011. 
Our second measure of financial openness is the Financial Freedom Index (FINFREE), 
which represents one of the ten components of the Index of Economic Freedom published 
annually by the Heritage Foundation. FINFREE measures the extent of government 
regulation of financial services, the extent of state intervention in banks and other financial 
services, the difficulty of opening and operating financial services firms (for both domestic 
and foreign individuals), and the government influence on the allocation of credit. The index 
assigns an overall score on a scale of 0–100 where 0 means that private financial institutions 
are prohibited and 100 means that government influence is negligible. Therefore, higher 
values of the index indicate greater financial freedom.
As our third measure, we consider the percentage of foreign-owned banks operating 
in the domestic market (FOREIGN), which has commonly been applied in previous studies of 
bank performance (e.g., Pasiouras et al., 2009). This additional measure also allows us to 
control for the effect of foreign presence in the domestic banking sector while investigating 
the effect of financial openness using the above two measures. 
In recognition of the fact that the results of efficiency studies are inevitably affected 
by the variables choice, it should be emphasized that using different measures of financial 
Page 21 of 60
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
`
21
openness serves to ensure that our choice is representative, and that includes de jure as well 
as de facto indicators (Kose et al., 2009; Gehinger, 2013). The Chinn and Ito (2008) indicator 
is a de jure indicator, based on a principal components model. Similarly, FINFREE, being a 
policy-based measure, is also a de jure indicator.  However, Kose et al. (2009) and Gehringer 
(2013) argue that a de facto measure of liberalization is more reliable. Although FOREIGN is 
a de facto measure of financial openness (by construction), as a further check for robustness, 
we also consider an alternative de facto measure (FINOPEN-Kose) as computed by Kose et al. 
(2009) using the ratio of the sum of the gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, 
which is based on the External Wealth of Nations Database constructed by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2007). 
3.4. Bank risk
We consider three alternative measures of bank risk in our analysis.  First, as our main 
measure, we use Z-score (ZSCORE), which reflects the probability of a bank’s insolvency 
risk based on the amount of buffer the bank has, to guard against shocks to earnings. 
ZSCORE is calculated as , where ROA is the rate of return on 
assets, E/A is the equity to asset ratio, and is an estimate of the standard deviation of 
the rate of return on assets.7  Z-score can thus be interpreted as the number of standard 
deviations by which returns would have to fall from the mean to deplete all equity in the bank 
(see, e.g., Fang et al., 2014). A high ZSCORE implies that the bank is more stable due to its 
inverse relationship with the bank’s insolvency probability. 
Second, as part of robustness, we account for bank credit risk by using the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans (NPL/L), with a higher proportion of non-performing 
                                                          
7 As Laeven and Levine (2009) indicate, the above Z-score measure is highly skewed, so its natural 
logarithm (which is normally distributed) is commonly used. A higher value of Z-score implies a 
lower default risk.
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loans signifying a higher credit risk of banks. Although NPL/L may not be a reliable measure 
since it may be inconsistent across banks (which use special purpose vehicles to manage part 
of their loans outside their loan book) as well as across countries (as banks adopt different 
criteria depending on the jurisdiction and also might adopt differentiated write off policies), it 
complements the mix of different risk measures used by being an accounting measure that 
focuses on credit risk subject to managerial discretion, and can be considered a ‘point-in-
time’ risk measure (see Fiordelisi et al., 2011). 
Finally, in our SFA, we also consider marginal expected shortfall (MES) as described 
by Acharya et al. (2012). Thanks to its coverage of systemic risk – and unlike ZSCORE and 
NPL/L – MES can be considered a measure of firm-level risk linked to the risk of breakdown 
of the whole banking system. The MES of a firm is defined as the expected loss an equity 
investor in a financial firm would experience if the market declined substantially, and is 
constructed by Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014b) at the country level. This measure is 
commonly employed in the literature to capture a financial institution’s exposure to systemic 
risk and we include it to complement our measures of bank risk as MES can be broadly 
rationalized in terms of standard balance sheet indicators of bank financial soundness as well 
as systemic importance. The logic underlying this choice is based on the notion that a 
shortage of capital is dangerous for the individual bank, but also for the whole economy if it 
occurs at a time when also the rest of the banking sector is undercapitalized.
3.5. Control variables
Regulation and supervision 
Following previous studies that focus on bank regulations and efficiency (Barth et al., 
2013b; Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Pasiouras et al., 
2009), we employ a set of four index-based measures to control for country-specific 
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differences in banking regulations. They represent capital requirements (CAPR), the degree 
of official supervisory power (SUP), the degree of private monitoring (PRIM), and 
restrictions on bank activities (ACTR). The data for these indicators are sourced from Barth et 
al. (2013a). 
CAPR is an index that measures both initial and overall capital stringency. Overall 
capital stringency estimates whether capital requirements reflect certain risk elements and 
deduct certain market value losses from capital before minimum capital adequacy is 
determined. On the other hand, the initial capital stringency examines whether certain funds 
may be used to initially capitalize a bank and whether they are officially verified. The 
construction of the index is based on a set of eight questions with higher scores reflecting 
more capital stringency. The results of the previous empirical studies assessing the impact of 
capital stringency on bank performance are mixed. For example, Barth et al. (2006) indicate 
that there is no strong correlation between the capital stringency and bank performance, 
whereas Pasiouras et al. (2009) find a negative association with bank profit efficiency. 
SUP measures the degree of official power of the supervisory authorities based on 
information relating to whether bank supervisors can take relevant actions against bank 
management, with higher value of SUP indicating greater powers of supervision. Barth et al. 
(2004) show that strict supervision can prevent banks from engaging in excessive risk taking 
and, in so doing, contribute to bank stability and development. On the other hand, Quintyn 
and Taylor (2003) warn that improper regulatory and supervisory policies can lead to 
financial instability and strong supervisory power might relate to corruption as supervisors 
use their power to benefit preferred organizations. Barth et al. (2006) conclude that if a 
‘public interest’ view prevails then a powerful supervisory approach should directly improve 
bank efficiency through increased competition. However, the ‘private interest’ approach to 
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supervisory power contends that effective supervision should encourage private monitoring 
through requirements of bank disclosure of information. 
PRIM measures the degree of private monitoring in the regulatory approach, which 
requires banks to release accurate and comprehensive information to the public. PRIM takes a 
value from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating more stringent requirements on information 
disclosure and private monitoring. Pasiouras et al. (2009) and Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras 
(2010) unveil a positive impact of enhanced monitoring on profit efficiency.
Finally, ACTR measures the degree of restrictions on bank activities in securities, 
insurance, real estate investment, and ownership of non-financial firms; the higher the value, 
the greater the restrictions. Barth et al. (2004) indicate that activity restrictions serve to limit 
risk-taking incentives of banks in gaining more profitability, and while it is hard to monitor 
complex and large banks, activity restrictions may contribute to lower competition and 
efficiency. 
Bank specific controls
Following Fiordelisi et al. (2011) and Laeven and Levine (2007) among others, we 
also include bank-specific factors that may influence the mean inefficiency of banks, 
including: diversification across different asset types (ASSETDIV), calculated as 1- [(Net 
Loans – Other Earning Assets) / Total Earning Assets]; diversification across different 
sources of income (INCMDIV), calculated as 1- [(Net Interest Income – Other Operating 
Income) / Total Operating Income]; and bank size (SIZE), proxied by the natural logarithm of 
total bank assets. Both asset diversity and income diversity take values between 0 and 1, 
which increase with the degree of diversification. 
Other country-specific controls
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In addition, we control for differences in market structure using a measure of bank 
concentration (CONC) defined as a ratio of the total assets of the three largest commercial 
banks to the total assets of all commercial banks of a country; and in financial development 
using the ratio of claims on the private sector to GDP (CLAIM) thus capturing the extent of 
financial intermediation. We also account for banking crises using a dummy variable which 
takes value 1 for three years, covering the year of inception of a crisis as reported by Laeven 
and Valencia (2012) and the two following years, and value 0 otherwise.  Kroszner et al. 
(2007), Dell'Ariccia et al. (2008), Cubillas et al. (2012), and Fernández et al. (2013) have also 
used this definition to capture the effect of the crises. Finally, in addition to time dummies 
used to capture the effects of technological change, we introduce a development dummy 
(DEVEL) to represent the effect of unobserved environmental factors that are common within 
different levels of economic development (as in Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010).
3.6. Data
We constructed our sample by first considering all the commercial banks in the 
Bankscope database (Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing), and then excluding: (i) banks 
operating in countries for which any of the above financial openness measures were not 
available; (ii) banks for which other country-specific variables were not available; (iii) bank-
year observations for which at least one of the bank-specific variables was missing; and (iv) 
bank-year observations through the ‘Winsorization’ of all bank-level data at the top and 
bottom 1 percentiles to account for extreme values and unobservable input errors.  This 
process led to a final sample of 9,999 bank-year observations, covering 140 countries and 
2,007 commercial banks of unbalanced panel data for the period 1999-2011. All bank-
specific data were obtained from the balance sheets and income statements of commercial 
banks in the Bankscope database, and all input and output variables were adjusted using GDP 
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deflators (1995 = 100). Data for each individual bank is expressed in US million dollars for a 
given year. The sample covers only commercial banks in order to make efficiency estimates 
comparable for cross-country analysis. Besides, restricting the sample to commercial banks 
makes the similarity of production technology assumption that is implicit in our model more 
realistic. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for bank-specific and country-specific 
variables. All the figures seem plausible and are generally in line with those typically 
reported in previous studies.  Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients of the variables, 
and their respective statistical significance, showing reassuring values. 
4.  Results
4.1. Profit efficiency scores
Prior to presenting the SYS-GMM causality test results, it appears opportune to 
provide a brief discussion of the average estimated efficiency scores, which are presented in 
Table 3 using a global frontier, where the results are distinguished by year and between 
developed and developing economies.  These can be briefly summarized as follows. 
First, the overall average profit efficiency for the entire sample is 0.5155, implying 
that an average bank could improve its profits by a considerable amount (around 48 per cent) 
relative to the best practice bank in the sample. These estimates are broadly comparable to 
those reported in some US and European studies (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997; DeYoung 
and Hasan, 1998; Maudos et al., 2002) although they are generally lower than those found in 
some recent cross-country studies (e.g., Gaganis and Pasiouras, 2013).  Part of the reason 
may be due to the inclusion of financial openness and risk indicators in our analysis.
Second, the trend in profit efficiency over time has been cyclical, declining during 
1999-2000 before increasing steadily over the period 2000-2006, and then declining sharply 
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again during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 before picking up slightly in 2010. The 
variability in profit efficiency is also lower when profit efficiency is generally high. 
Third, the cyclical trend observed in profit efficiency is similar for both developed and 
developing countries, although the overall mean scores suggest that banks in developed 
countries are marginally less profit efficient than in developing countries, as has been 
observed in previous studies (e.g., Pasiouras et al., 2009). 
4.2. Dynamic GMM estimation and Granger causality 
The results of the estimation of the dynamic models and Granger causality tests are 
reported in Tables 4 and 5, where Panel A shows the estimates of profit efficiency and Panel 
B the estimates of risk regressions. For this analysis we capture the influence of financial 
openness using FINOPEN (Chinn-Ito) and FINFREE as proxies (with the corresponding 
results shown in columns 1 and 2, respectively). The influence of bank risk is captured using 
two measures, namely Z-score (Table 4), and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, 
NPL/L (Table 5).  Both tables provide SYS-GMM estimates to account for potential 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables and the possibility of reverse causality between 
profit efficiency and risk.  The regressions are conducted with two lags for both the 
dependent and independent variables, and the results display the total (sum of lags) effect, as 
well as the long-run effect of the causal variables on the dependent variable. The 
Sargan/Hansen and Arellano-Bond tests reported in the tables confirm the validity of the 
instruments underlying SYS-GMM estimation and the absence of serial correction in the 
first-differenced residuals, respectively.
In Table 4, where bank risk is measured by ZSCORE, the results (in Panel A) show 
that financial openness (whether FINOPEN or FINFREE) negatively Granger-causes bank 
profit efficiency (PE).  Although the initial effect of FINOPEN on PE is positive (at first lag), 
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this is offset by a negative impact at second lag, yielding the total effect, and consequently 
the long run effect, negative.  In the case of FINFREE, the effect on PE is statistically 
significant (and negative) only at second lag.  The results also show that an increase in bank 
soundness (implied by the positive and statistically significant total lag effect of ZSCORE) 
temporally precedes an increase in PE.  Conversely, therefore, higher bank risk measured by 
the inverse of Z-score negatively Ganger-causes lower PE.  The results (in Panel B) confirm 
that PE positively Granger-causes ZSCORE, implying that lower (higher) bank profit 
efficiency temporally precedes higher (lower) bank risk.  Here, additionally, the results show 
that neither of the two measures of financial openness (FINOPEN/FINFREE) has a 
statistically significant impact on ZSCORE.  
Table 5 reports the results using the NPL/L measure of bank risk, and these are 
broadly similar to those of Table 4, with financial openness found to negatively Granger-
cause PE.  While the effect of FINOPEN / FINFREE on PE is more pronounced in the 
second lag, and that of NPL/L on PE is more significant in the first lag, the total effect of 
these causal variables on PE is statistically significant, confirming a negative association of 
profit efficiency with both financial openness and risk. In addition, the results (in Panel B)
show that PE negatively Granger-causes NPL/L, with the effect being significant (and much 
stronger in terms of magnitude) in both first and second lags. This result supports the above 
finding (using ZSCORE) that lower bank profit efficiency temporally precedes higher bank 
risk, a finding consistent with the “skimping” hypothesis, implying that a bank may be 
tempted to increase revenues simply by taking on higher risks to compensate for lost returns 
that may be associated with increased competition (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; Fiordelisi et 
al., 2011). Additionally, we find that FINFREE negatively Granger-causes the NPL/L risk 
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measure although its total effect is only statistically significant at the 10% level, while the 
effect of FINOPEN is not significant at all.
8
In both Tables 4 and 5, the results confirm the persistence of own (lagged) effects on 
profit efficiency and risk. In particular, the dynamic effects of PE (Panel A) are statistically 
significant at both lags while those of risk (Panel B) persist mainly in the first period.  In 
terms of the magnitude of the estimates of the causal variables, the results also confirm that 
the total effect of PE on risk (whether NPL/L or ZSCORE) is greater than that of financial 
openness (whether FINOPEN or FINFREE) on PE. More significantly, the causality that runs 
from PE to risk is much stronger than that which runs from risk to PE, given that the long-run 
effects are much higher in the former case than in the latter, under both measures of financial 
openness.
9
Taken together, the results indicate that both higher financial openness and higher 
bank risk Granger-cause lower profit efficiency. Our findings also reveal bidirectional 
causality between bank risk and efficiency as found in previous studies (e.g., Fiordelisi et al., 
2011), though the profit efficiency channel influencing risk is much stronger than vice versa.  
This implies that, since financial openness does not Granger-cause bank risk (directly), its 
effect on higher bank risk operates (and persists) indirectly through lower profit efficiency.
4.3. SFA base results
To ascertain the sensitivity of our SYS-GMM results, in this section we report the 
base results of SFA.  Table 6 shows the results highlighting the impact of financial openness, 
                                                          
8
Hence this effect is not robust across both measures of financial openness and to the extent that it 
does Granger-cause lower bank risk - albeit at 10% significance level - it may be seen as supporting 
the diversification hypothesis (Berger et al., 2015). 
9 For instance, with FINOPEN as the conditioning variable, the long-run effect of the unit change in 
PE on ZSCORE is 0.6340 while that of a unit change in ZSCORE on PE is 0.1103.  The 
corresponding figures under the NPL/L measure of risk are -21.6605 and -0.0132. Similarly, 
conditional on FINFREE, the results confirm the dominance of the PE to risk channel.
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risk and other control variables on bank profit inefficiency, estimated using the Battese and 
Coelli (1995) model. Here we use three different measures of financial openness and the 
results using each of these measures are reported individually and jointly in columns 1-8, in 
turn for each measure of bank risk (NPL/L and ZSCORE).
The results in columns (1), (4), (5) and (8) show that FINOPEN (Chinn-Ito), which 
captures the effect of capital account openness, has a statistically significant and positive 
impact on profit inefficiency. This implies that financial openness has, therefore, a negative 
association with profit efficiency, suggesting that banks in countries with a higher degree of 
financial openness are likely to be less profit efficient. In terms of the economic magnitude of 
this effect, the estimated FINOPEN coefficients (all statistically significant at the 1% level) 
range from 0.1063 (column 4) to 0.1419 (column 8). 
Next, we consider the effect of financial freedom (FINFREE) and foreign presence 
represented by the percentage of foreign owned banks in the domestic banking sector 
(FOREIGN). The results pertaining to financial freedom (FINFREE) in columns (2) and (6), 
and those related to foreign ownership (FOREIGN) in columns (3) and (7), confirm a 
negative association with profit efficiency, though the magnitude of the effects is lower than 
that of capital account openness (FINOPEN-Chinn-Ito). In columns (4) and (8) we 
simultaneously include all financial openness variables, added individually in columns (1) -
(3) and (5) – (7), and the main results hold with minor differences.
The negative impact of financial openness on profit efficiency is consistent with most 
previous studies assessing the impact, directly or indirectly, of financial liberalization on 
profit efficiency (e.g., Denizer et al., 2007; Williams and Intarachote, 2003) and can be 
explained by the fact that while financial openness may stimulate banks to engage in 
restructuring and diversification of their portfolios, some of the bankers may lack specific 
technological skills and knowledge, for instance in risk management, which may reduce their 
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profitability. Additionally, greater competition associated with the presence of foreign banks 
in the domestic market creates pressures on local banks (typically operating at less than 
optimal capacity) to consolidate their operations, and the resulting scale problem is likely to 
adversely affect their profit efficiency.
The results in Table 6 also confirm a statistically significant and positive association 
of credit risk (NPL/L) with profit inefficiency (columns 1-4), implying that higher credit risk 
associated with increased provisions for bad performing loans contributes to lowering profit 
efficiency. Similarly, with the effect of ZSCORE on profit inefficiency being negative 
(columns 5-8), profit efficiency is negatively associated with insolvency risk (inverse of Z-
score). Hence, the results confirm that higher bank risk lowers profit efficiency.
With regard to the regulatory and supervisory control measures (CAPR, PRIM, ACTR 
and SUP), they are all statistically significant, thereby confirming that the effects of   
financial openness and risk on profit efficiency are significant after controlling for the 
regulatory and supervisory environment. It is also worth noting that three of these measures 
(CAPR, PRIM and ACTR) are negatively related to profit inefficiency, implying that they 
improve profit efficiency while the one reflecting official supervisory power (SUP) is 
positively related to profit inefficiency. The overwhelming evidence in support of a positive 
influence on profit efficiency is consistent with the findings of most previous studies (e.g., 
Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Pasiouras et al., 2009) and could be seen to provide 
empirical content to the ‘public interest’ view, which suggests that the government acts in the 
interests of the public and regulates banks to promote efficient banking and ameliorate 
market failures (Barth et al., 2006, 2013b). Nevertheless, we would call for caution in 
extrapolating too much inference from the signs of these estimated coefficients since without 
the estimation of interaction effects (see, for example, Cubillas and González, 2014) the 
significance of these regulatory and supervisory measures in counteracting the effects of 
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financial openness remains one to be interpreted within their function as control variables in 
this model. 
With regard to the bank-specific controls, we find negative and statistically significant 
effects between asset diversification (ASSETDIV), income diversification (INCMDIV), size 
(SIZE) and bank profit inefficiency. The results imply that more diversified bank business 
and larger banks enjoy greater profit efficiency gains. 
Among the other country-specific controls, the effect of the banking crises dummy 
(CRISIS) has a proportionately much larger impact on lowering profit efficiency than the 
financial openness variables, a result consistent with the downward trend in profit efficiency 
observed over the 2007-2009 crisis period in Table 3. 
The statistically significant effect of the dummy (DEVEL) indicates that banks in 
developed countries are prone to higher profit inefficiency than those operating in developing 
countries. This result does not lend itself to a straightforward interpretation but it seems 
plausible to rationalize it by arguing that bank behaviour particularly in terms of excessive 
risk-taking may exacerbate the propensity of banks in developed countries to incur higher 
profit inefficiency. Moreover, banks in developed countries and in more developed financial 
systems may share a higher degree of co-dependence in default risk with other commercial 
banks around the world (for more on co-dependence see Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014a), 
thus making them more susceptible to common exposure to economic, liquidity and 
information shocks that increase both the likelihood and hence the profit-(in)efficiency 
incidence of a crisis than banks operating in developing countries.
Other results show that financial development (CLAIM), market concentration 
(CONC) and GDP growth (GDPGR) contribute to improving profit efficiency, while higher 
inflation (INFA) reduces profit efficiency. These results are consistent with those of 
aforementioned previous studies. 
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4.4. SFA robustness
In this section we investigate six additional issues that could influence our SFA 
results. First, whilst retaining ZSCORE as our main measure of bank risk, we also include 
NPL/L in the regression, thereby controlling for both measures of bank risk simultaneously.
These new results are shown in column (1) of Table 7 (to be compared with those reported in 
Table 6). Second, we run regressions over the pre-crisis years (from 1999 to 2006) and post-
crisis years (from 2007 to 2011). The results of this exercise are reported in columns (2) and 
(3). Third, in column (4), we use a Fourier Flexible (FF) profit function specification as an 
alternative to a standard profit function, implying the use of an alternative measure of (mean) 
profit inefficiency. Fourth, in column (5), we add to the baseline financial openness variables 
the de facto FINOPEN measure based on Kose et al. (2009) (FINOPEN-Kose). Fifth, in 
column (6), we replace ZSCORE with the MES measure of risk and also retain the FINOPEN-
Kose variable. The sample size of this estimation is curtailed by the availability of MES data. 
Finally, in columns (7) and (8), the empirical results of the standard profit frontier model are 
replicated after splitting the sample into two groups of countries, developed and developing.10  
We performed the latter exercise also in order to interrogate the assumption that estimating a 
global (common) frontier with environmental factors and regulatory conditions can 
adequately cater for differences in technology (despite the inclusion of country group 
dummies). Thus, by estimating separate frontiers for the two groups of countries, we account 
explicitly for potential differences in technology across the developed and developing 
nations. To validate this distinction, we run a Chow-type likelihood-ratio test that 
demonstrated at the 1% significance level that the null hypothesis of no structural change can 
                                                          
10 The division of the sample shows 591 banks from (31) developed countries and 1,207 banks from 
(102) developing countries, hence proportionally the sample reflects more banks from developed 
countries than from developing countries.
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be rejected and that it is, therefore, reasonable to split the sample into two sub-groups. The 
results unveil lower estimated coefficients in column (8) compared to those in column (7),
implying that financial openness (as well as other variables) has a less pronounced effect on 
bank inefficiency in developing countries than in developed countries. This result is 
consistent with the earlier inference that banks in developed countries are more prone to 
higher profit inefficiency than in developing countries, although it should be noted that the 
earlier inference is based on the common frontier estimated for the entire sample while, by 
splitting the sample, we are now estimating two different frontiers.
    So, what main conclusions can we draw from these robustness tests? With respect to 
the effect of financial openness and risk variables, the results can be said to hold when 
compared with the base results under a common frontier (Table 6), thus not altering the 
overall orientation of our conclusions. Significantly, the effects of financial openness and risk 
are consistent in the pre- and post-crises periods as well as in developed and developing 
countries, being positively associated with profit inefficiency.  However, as the frontier 
changes with the change in sample size or specification, then inevitably some of the results 
are affected. In particular, the results of the de facto FINOPEN-Kose are only consistent in a 
reduced sample size and/or with the added effect of the base financial openness variables. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of this effect changes significantly with the inclusion of MES
(column 6), becoming considerably larger compared to other financial openness variables, 
albeit in a reduced sample owing to data availability. One explanation for the significant 
change in the effects of FINOPEN (de facto as well as de jure) on profit inefficiency with the 
inclusion of MES is that when a predictor of a "tail event" in the market (i.e., of a firm loss if 
the overall market declines) is accounted for in the model, then the positive (negative) effect 
of FINOPEN on bank inefficiency (efficiency) changes considerably, with an increase in the 
case of the de facto measure (FINOPEN-Kose) from 0.0056 to 0.0980 and a decrease in the 
Page 35 of 60
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
`
35
case of the de jure measure (FINOPEN-Chinn-Ito) from 0.1505 to 0.0439. This suggests that 
a de facto FINOPEN measure influences bank profit efficiency more significantly especially 
when the risk of a firm loss is linked to the risk of an overall market decline or systemic 
banking crisis, not bank risk per se.  In general, however, the causal effect of the de facto
FINOPEN on profit efficiency is less clear than that of the de jure FINOPEN.  Kose et al. 
(2009) report some divergence across the findings of de jure and de facto measures of 
financial openness in their impact on total factor productivity (TFP) growth, and Quinn et al. 
(2011) too report systematic variations in output growth effects using these two types of 
measures.  
Furthermore, though the earlier inference drawn for the effect of the dummy (DEVEL), 
probably still applies under a common frontier using SFA, it no longer applies when the 
frontier changes with the change in sample size or specification. Specifically, the negative 
and statistically significant effect of DEVEL occurs in the following two cases: (i) under the 
reduced, pre-crisis sample 1999-2006 estimated using SFA; and (ii) under the full sample 
1999-2011 estimated using the FF specification. The change in sign of DEVEL from negative 
to positive in pre- and post-crises periods, respectively, may be associated with the 
restructuring of the banking systems that developed countries have endured as a result of the 
crisis. In short, the only consequence of changing the sample size (under SFA) or the 
specification is the impact on de facto versus de jure FINOPEN and DEVEL, the rest of the 
results remain mostly consistent. 
5.  Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of financial openness on bank profit efficiency by 
accounting for the endogenous role of bank risk. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
study that explicitly estimates the impact of financial openness on both, bank risk and profit 
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efficiency in a cross-country setting by distinguishing between its direct influence and the 
effect that occurs through each of the two bank characteristics, efficiency and risk 
respectively. The study contributes to both, a better understanding of how financial openness 
affects the efficient operation of banks as well as bank risk and, given our investigation of the 
directional causality between the latter and bank profit efficiency, our knowledge of the 
channels through which the direct or indirect effects of financial openness are transmitted. 
Using data for a large sample of 9,999 bank-year observations covering up to 140 
countries over the period 1999-2011, we employ dynamic panel regressions to conduct 
Granger causality tests using system GMM estimation, complementing the analysis with SFA 
to estimate profit efficiency of banks while controlling for other variables and various 
country-specific and bank characteristics. The results can be summarized as follows: (a) 
Financial openness reduces bank profit efficiency directly, not through changes in bank risk; 
(b) Bank risk reduces bank profit efficiency regardless of financial openness; (c) Financial 
openness increases bank risk indirectly through the decreased bank profit efficiency. 
Given our results, we can conclude that financial openness has a negative effect both 
in terms of bank risk and profit efficiency. Yet, caution should be exercised in taking this 
evidence to signify that the overall net effect of financial openness on the banking sector is 
harmful since there are potential benefits associated with financial openness owing to greater 
financial development that may counterbalance the negative effects we unveiled. These 
benefits, the analysis of which was beyond the scope of our study, include improvements in 
the quality and availability of financial services, opportunities to draw upon an international 
pool of resources, the spreading of new technologies leading to bank productivity 
improvements, enhanced risk management techniques, in addition to wider spillover effects 
expected to have a beneficial impact on the domestic economy. We attribute the negative 
effect of financial openness on profit efficiency to implicit costs, such as consolidation of 
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banking operations, restructuring of bank portfolios, lack of risk management skills, and poor 
lending decisions, all of which may undermine bank profits and, in turn, induce banks to take 
on greater risk. In an increasingly globalized world, the policy implications that naturally 
flow from our findings call for greater prudential regulation and supervision with the aim of 
addressing the trade-off between financial liberalization and risk. Stricter capital 
requirements and monitoring could help constrain bankers’ tendency to engage in higher risk-
taking, while institutional reforms might foster better incentives for profitable investment 
opportunities to emerge from financial openness.
Two final caveats relating to our acknowledgement of limitations are in order. First, 
although as a test for robustness we account for the effect of banking crises using a dummy 
variable (which captures the year of inception of a crisis and the two following years), a more 
sophisticated investigation of how both temporary and/or permanent shocks to the variables 
in question may affect the intricate relationships among them is called for in order to gain a 
deeper understanding of the extent to which such breaks may be short-lived or bring 
permanent nonlinearities into play. 
Second, studies wishing to extend our investigation may consider a deeper analytical 
treatment of the variables used as controls for the regulatory and supervisory environment so 
as to gauge the extent to which they counteract or exacerbate the impact of financial openness 
(and risk) on profit efficiency. Controlling for these measures allowed us to check whether 
the effects are, in fact, due to changes in financial openness or risk irrespective of the 
regulatory and supervisory environment. However, it could be of interest to examine further 
whether these regulatory characteristics make the effects more or less intense by including a 
number of interaction terms in the model.
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Appendix A. Description of variables
Variable Description Source
Financial Openness 
(FINOPEN-Chinn-Ito)
The Chinn-Ito index measures the degree of capital account 
openness. Construction is based on transactions from the IMF’s 
Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER). The index is scored 0-4 using dummy 
variables based on four major categories: (i) the presence of 
multiple exchange rates; (ii) restrictions on current account 
transactions; (iii) restrictions on capital account transactions; (iv) 
the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. For each 
category, the index equals 1 when the restriction does not exist, 
otherwise 0. For the third category of the controls on capital 
transactions, the authors use the share of a five-year window and 
incorporate three transactions variables. Overall, the higher value of 
this index implies more openness of the countries’ capital account 
transactions.
Chinn and Ito (2008). This paper uses the 2010 
version of the database, available from: 
http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm
Financial Freedom 
(FINFREE)
Financial freedom component of the Heritage index of Economic 
Freedom.  This is a composite index representing: (i) the extent of 
government regulation of financial services; (ii) the degree of state 
intervention in banks and other financial services; (iii) the extent of 
financial and capital market development; (iv) the difficulty of 
opening and operating financial services firms (for both domestic 
and foreign individuals); and (v) government influence on the 
allocation of credit.  On a scale of 0-100, a higher value of the index 
implies greater freedom.
The Heritage Foundation.  Available from:
http://www.heritage.org/index/
Foreign Ownership 
(FOREIGN)
The percentage share of foreign-owned banks among total number 
of banks in a country.
Barth et al. (2013a)
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Financial Openness 
(FINOPEN-Kose)
Gross stocks of foreign assets and liabilities over GDP, as defined 
by Kose et al. (2009) using the External Wealth of Nations 
Database constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
Updated and extended dataset available from: 
http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html
Z-score
(ZSCORE)
Indicator of bank soundness calculated as the natural logarithm of 
Z-score = (ROA + E/A) / σ(ROA). 
Authors’ calculation using data from Bankscope
Non-performing  Loans
(NPL/L)
Ratio of non-performing loans over total loans as a proxy for credit 
risk.
Authors’ calculation using data from Bankscope
Marginal Expected Shortfall
(MES)
A measure of a financial institution’s exposure to systemic risk as 
defined by Acharya et al. (2012).
Anginer and Demirgüç-Kunt (2014b)
Capital Requirements 
(CAPR)
Index of capital requirements, composed on the basis of answers to 
following qu stions: (1) Is the capital-asset ratio risk weighted in 
line with the Basel I guidelines? (2) Does the minimum capital-asset 
ratio vary as a function of an individual bank’s credit risk? (3) Does 
the minimum capital-asset ratio vary as a function of market risk? 
(4) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the 
following are deducted from the book value of capital? Market 
value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? Unrealized 
losses in securities portfolios? Or unrealized foreign exchange 
losses? (5) What fraction of revaluation gains is allowed as part of 
capital? (6) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified 
by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (7) Can the initial 
disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets 
Barth et al. (2013a)
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other than cash or government securities? (8) Can initial 
disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? On a scale of 
0-10, larger values of this index indicate more stringent capital 
regulation.
Official Supervisory Power 
(SUP)
Index of official supervisory power, determined by adding 1 if 
answer is yes or 0 otherwise to each of these questions: (1) Does the 
supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors 
about banks? (2) Are auditors required to communicate directly to 
the supervisory agency about elicit activities, fraud, or insider 
abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal action against external 
auditors for negligence? (4) Can the supervisory authority force a 
bank to change its internal organizational structure? (5) Are off-
balance sheet items disclosed to supervisors? (6) Can the 
supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or management to 
constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? (7) Can the 
supervisory agency suspend the directors’ decision to distribute (a) 
dividends, (b) bonuses, and (c) management fees? (8) Can the 
supervisory agency supersede the rights of bank shareholders and 
declare a bank insolvent? (9) Can the supervisory agency suspend 
some or all ownership rights? (10) Can the supervisory agency (a) 
supersede shareholder rights, (b) remove and replace management, 
and (c) remove and replace director? The range of this index 0-14, 
with larger values indicating greater supervisory power.
Barth et al. (2013a)
Private Monitoring
 (PRIM)
Index of private monitoring, composed on the basis of: (1) whether 
bank directors and officials are legally liable for the accuracy of 
information disclosed to the public, (2) whether banks must publish 
consolidated accounts, (3) whether banks must be audited by 
certified international auditors, (4) whether 100 percent of the 
largest 10 banks are rated by international rating agencies, (5) 
whether off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public, (6) 
whether banks must disclose their risk management procedures to 
Barth et al. (2013a)
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the public, (7) whether accrued, though unpaid interest/principal, 
enter the income statement while the loan is still non-performing, 
(8) whether subordinated debt is allowable as part of capital, and (9) 
whether there is no explicit deposit insurance system and no 
insurance was paid the last time a bank failed. On a scale of 0-12, 
higher values of this index indicate greater regulatory empowerment 
of the monitoring of banks by private investors.
Activity Restrictions
 (ACTR)
Index of activity restrictions. The score for this variable is 
determined by the extent to which banks may engage in: (a) 
underwriting, brokering and dealing in securities, and all aspects of 
the mutual fund industry, (b) insurance underwriting and selling, 
and (c) real estate investment, development, and management.  
These activities can be unrestricted, permitted, restricted or 
prohibited, that are assigned the values 1-4 respectively. Higher 
values indicate greater restrictiveness.
Barth et al (2013a)
Concentration
(CONC)
Concentration in the banking sector, calculated as the share of assets 
attributed to three largest banks from the total commercial banking 
assets in the country.
Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A (2006). 2010 version of 
database available from: http://econ.worldbank.org/
Asset Diversity 
(ASSETDIV)
A measure of diversification across different types of assets, 
computed by the formula: 1 - | (Net loans – Other Earning Assets) / 
Total Earning Assets |.
Authors’ calculations using data from Bankscope
Income diversity 
(INCMDIV)
A measure of diversification across different sources of income, 
computed by the formula: 1- | (Net Interest Income – Other 
Operating Income) / Total Operating Income |.
Authors’ calculations using data from Bankscope
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Size (SIZE) Natural logarithm of total assets (in US dollars). Authors’ calculations using data from Bankscope
Financial Development 
(CLAIM)
The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. World Bank Global Financial Development Database
GDP Growth (GDPGR) Real annual GDP growth rate. Global Market Information Database
Inflation (INFA) Inflation rate (annual % change of Average consumer price index). Global Market Information Database
Banking Crises
(CRISIS)
Systemic banking crises dummy, which takes the value 1 in the year 
that the crisis occurs in a country and for 2 years after, 0 otherwise.
Laeven and Valencia (2012)
Development (DEVEL) Country dummy taking value 1 for developed, and 0 for developing. IMF
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Variable
Number of 
Observations Mean Standard Deviation
Coefficient of 
Variation Min Max P1 P99
Profit frontier variables
ln(PBT/W3) 9,999 3.1046 2.3113 5.3423 -5.1299 11.2382 -1.0986 8.5524
ln(P1/W3) 9,999 -3.0421 1.1193 1.2529 -9.5131 1.5249 -6.3946 -0.6416
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ln(P2/W3) 9,999 -3.1157 1.4935 2.2304 -12.2518 3.0445 -7.4336 0.3112
ln(W1/W3) 9,999 -3.5221 1.2216 1.4922 -11.5626 1.8157 -7.0476 -0.9324
ln(W2/W3) 9,999 -4.5278 1.1826 1.3986 -12.6873 0.5431 -8.3998 -2.0279
ln(EQ) 9,999 5.4353 1.8539 3.4368 0.6931 11.9343 2.0787 10.1900
Inefficiency terms
FINOPEN-Chinn-Ito 9,999 1.4774 2.1827 -1.8750 2.4218 -1.8750 2.4218 1.4774
FINFREE 9,961 56.9836 18.9968 360.9040 10.0000 90.0000 30.0000 90.0000
FOREIGN 9,999 41.7457 34.1186 1164.0791 0.0000 100.0000 0.0000 100.0000
NPL/L 9,999 5.4858 6.4828 42.0268 0.0300 45.1900 0.0700 32.5500
ZSCORE 9,712 2.9116 1.0649 1.1341 -4.1746 8.5048 0.1077 5.4058
CAPR 9,999 6.8564 1.6605 2.7573 1.0000 10.0000 3.0000 10.0000
SUP 9,999 11.0741 2.3249 5.4051 4.0000 16.0000 6.0000 16.0000
PRIM 9,999 8.1637 1.4386 2.0695 4.0000 11.0000 5.0000 11.0000
ACT 9,999 7.4948 2.1346 4.5566 3.0000 12.0000 3.0000 12.0000
CONC 9,999 58.8842 19.6965 387.9535 21.3973 100.0000 22.1537 100.0000
CLAIM 9,999 77.2850 54.3326 2952.0325 2.2071 315.4939 5.1712 225.8926
GDPG 9,999 2.6599 4.2560 18.1131 -16.5892 33.0305 -8.8356 12.5898
INFA 9,999 6.1562 7.2307 52.2836 -27.6317 142.4782 -3.6634 28.1119
DEVEL 9,999 0.3382 0.4731 0.2238 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
ASSETDIV 9,999 0.5842 0.2490 0.0620 0.0500 0.9927 0.0759 0.9855
SIZE 9,999 7.7960 2.0116 4.0465 3.9512 13.8945 4.2047 13.2589
INCMDIV 9,999 0.6138 0.2762 0.0763 0.0144 1.0000 0.0377 1.0000
CRISIS 9,999 0.0357 0.1856 0.0344 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
FINOPEN-Kose 9,999 3.2443 5.2603 27.6711 0.3374 75.7574 0.4621 22.1160
MES 6,373 0.0215 0.0169 0.0003 -0.1087 0.0927 -0.0113 0.0629
Note: Variables are defined in Appendix A. P1 and P99 refer to the 1% and 99% percentiles. We exclude all bank-level data that are below 1st and above 99th percentiles.
Table 2
Correlation coefficients of determinants of efficiency.
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Notes: Variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. The sample period is 1999–2011.  All 
FINOPEN
-Chinn-Ito
FINFREE FOREIGN FINOPEN -
Kose
NPL/L ZSCORE MES CAPR SUP PRIM
FINOPEN
- Chinn-Ito
1.0000
FINFREE 0.6471*** 1.0000
FOREIGN -0.0200** -0.0207** 1.0000
FINOPEN
- Kose
0.3525*** 0.4259*** -0.0609*** 1.0000
NPL/L -0.1002*** -0.1255*** 0.0393*** -0.0729*** 1.0000
ZSCORE 0.0676*** 0.0895*** -0.0848*** 0.1131*** -0.2368*** 1.0000
MES -0.3261*** -0.2753*** 0.0165 -0.1311*** 0.0130 -0.1009*** 1.0000
CAPR -0.1296*** -0.1811*** -0.1343*** -0.9998*** 0.0702*** 0.0443*** 0.0989*** 1.0000
SUP 0.0457*** 0.0178* 0.0015 -0.0262*** -0.0031 -0.0078 -0.2152*** 0.1793*** 1.0000
PRIM 0.1609*** 0.1715*** 0.0715*** 0.1063*** -0.0806*** -0.0388*** 0.0494*** 0.0443*** 0.0793*** 1.0000
ACTR -0.2503*** -0.3979*** -0.0085 -0.3296*** -0.0329*** 0.0128 0.0555*** 0.1180*** 0.1346*** 0.0256**
CONC 0.2934*** 0.3143*** 0.0328*** 0.2614*** 0.0023 0.1144*** -0.3288*** -0.1474*** -0.0120 -0.0804***
CLAIM 0.3944*** 0.4412*** -0.0216** 0.4871*** -0.1364*** 0.2078*** -0.0813*** -0.0911*** -0.1144*** 0.1848***
GDPGR -0.3067*** -0.2811*** -0.0398*** -0.1231*** -0.1336*** 0.0308*** 0.0812*** 0.0140 0.0510*** -0.0855***
INFA -0.3617*** -0.4159*** 0.0169* -0.2125*** 0.0327*** -0.1136*** 0.1339*** 0.0303*** 0.0604*** -0.1240***
DEVEL 0.6214*** 0.6245*** -0.0521*** 0.3883*** -0.1701*** 0.1477*** -0.1448*** -0.1583*** -0.1273*** 0.1923***
ASSETDIV -0.1269*** -0.1368*** -0.0183* -0.0314*** 0.0038 -0.0327*** 0.0112 0.0412*** -0.0100 0.0423***
SIZE 0.0002*** 0.1155*** 0.0395*** 0.1408*** -0.1503*** 0.0293*** 0.1136*** 0.0630*** -0.1276*** 0.2255***
INCMDIV 0.0514*** 0.0288*** 0.0036 -0.0303*** -0.0114 0.1211*** -0.0933*** -0.0441*** 0.0538*** -0.0079
CRISIS 0.1343*** 0.1579*** -0.0174* 0.0691*** -0.0148 -0.0022 0.0771*** 0.0094 -0.0319*** 0.0425***
ACTR CONC CLAIM GDPGR INFA DEVEL ASSETDIV SIZE INCMDIV CRISIS
ACTR 1
CONC -0.1681*** 1.0000
CLAIM -0.3258*** 0.2701*** 1.0000
GDPGR 0.1456*** -0.1058*** -0.1618*** 1.0000
INFA 0.1553*** -0.1480*** -0.3675*** 0.2357*** 1.0000
DEVEL -0.3355*** 0.2287*** 0.6774*** -0.2776*** -0.4252*** 1.0000
ASSETDIV 0.0903*** -0.0587*** -0.0767*** 0.0910*** 0.0518*** -0.1604*** 1.0000
SIZE -0.0721*** 0.0000 0.3381*** -0.0376*** -0.1583*** 0.2832*** 0.0979*** 1.0000
INCMDIV 0.0169* 0.0589*** -0.0912*** 0.0204** -0.0272*** -0.0409*** -0.0895*** -0.1344*** 1.0000
CRISIS -0.0813*** 0.0358*** 0.1619*** -0.1384*** -0.0636*** 0.1969*** -0.0748*** 0.0423*** -0.0588*** 1.0000
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pairwise correlations are calculated using the maximum number of observations available in the sample.
Table 3 
Profit efficiency estimates.
All Sample Developed Developing
Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev Year Obs. Mean Std. Dev
1999 234 0.5788 0.1999 1999 74 0.5658 0.1854 1999 160 0.5849 0.2066
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2000 330 0.4983 0.2247 2000 102 0.4892 0.2166 2000 228 0.5024 0.2286
2001 349 0.4705 0.2244 2001 108 0.4320 0.1929 2001 241 0.4878 0.2355
2002 354 0.5025 0.2249 2002 101 0.4617 0.2107 2002 253 0.5187 0.2288
2003 459 0.5239 0.2219 2003 135 0.5037 0.1872 2003 324 0.5324 0.2346
2004 596 0.5302 0.2159 2004 207 0.5318 0.2000 2004 389 0.5294 0.2241
2005 738 0.5788 0.2039 2005 297 0.5898 0.1958 2005 441 0.5713 0.2092
2006 865 0.5886 0.2040 2006 331 0.5979 0.1971 2006 534 0.5827 0.2081
2007 1,006 0.5778 0.1995 2007 357 0.5759 0.2015 2007 649 0.5789 0.1985
2008 1,116 0.4847 0.2214 2008 374 0.4297 0.2246 2008 742 0.5125 0.2147
2009 1,209 0.4423 0.2283 2009 414 0.4170 0.2218 2009 795 0.4555 0.2306
2010 1,255 0.4908 0.2301 2010 408 0.4745 0.2300 2010 847 0.4987 0.2299
2011 1,450 0.5017 0.2256 2011 474 0.4735 0.2224 2011 976 0.5153 0.2260
Total 9,961 0.5155 0.2236 Total 3,382 0.5006 0.2212 Total 6,579 0.5232 0.2245
Note: The table presents profit efficiency scores averaged by group and year. Estimation is based on main analysis in Table 4 using the Battese and Coelli (1995) model.
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Table 4
Granger causality for the relationship between financial openness, risk and profit efficiency.
(1) (2)
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Profit Efficiency (PE)
PE PE
L.PE 0.4980*** L.PE 0.5120***
(10.3728) (11.0382)
L2.PE 0.0824* L2.PE 0.0910**
(1.9345) (2.1960)
L.FINOPEN 0.1565* L.FINFREE -0.0000
(1.7627) (-0.1441)
L2.FINOPEN -0.1607* L2.FINFREE -0.0007**
(-1.8748) (-2.2995)
Ʃ(FINOPEN) -0.0042*** Ʃ(FINFREE) -0.0007***
Prob > χ2 0.0002 Prob > χ2 0.0000
LR (FINOPEN→PE) -0.0100 LR (FINFREE→PE) -0.0012
L.ZSCORE 0.0571*** L.ZSCORE 0.0505***
(3.3520) (3.1098)
L2.ZSCORE -0.0054 L2.ZSCORE -0.0015
(-0.3264) (-0.0895)
Ʃ(ZSCORE) 0.0463*** Ʃ(ZSCORE) 0.0520***
Prob > χ2 0.0031 Prob > χ2 0.0072
LR (ZSCORE→PE) 0.1103 LR (ZSCORE→PE) 0.1310
Year dummies Yes Year dummies Yes
AR(1) p-value 0.0000 AR(1) p-value 0.0000
AR(2) p-value 0.9640 AR(2) p-value 0.3320
Hansen p-value 0.4550 Hansen p-value 0.3080
Banks 1,811 Banks 1,798
Countries 138 Countries 133
N 5,748 N 5,743
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Risk (Z-score)
ZSCORE ZSCORE
L.ZSCORE 0.7801*** L.ZSCORE 0.9087***
(27.5443) (6.6703)
L2.ZSCORE 0.1218*** L2.ZSCORE -0.0080
(4.2394) (-0.0745)
L.PE 0.1278** L.PE 0.1256**
(2.3975) (2.3648)
L2.PE -0.0656 L2.PE -0.1045*
(-1.2830) (-1.8626)
Ʃ(PE) 0.0622* Ʃ(PE) 0.0211***
Prob > χ2 0.0973 Prob > χ2 0.0028
LR (PE→ZSCORE) 0.6340 LR (PE→ZSCORE) 0.2125
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L.FINOPEN 0.0138 L.FINFREE 0.0007
(1.2560) (1.2949)
L2.FINOPEN -0.0116 L2.FINFREE -0.0003
(-1.0800) (-0.6031)
Ʃ(FINOPEN) 0.0022 Ʃ(FINFREE) 0.0004
Prob > χ2 0.4372 Prob > χ2 0.1924
LR (FINOPEN→ZSCORE) 0.0224 LR (FINFREE→ZSCORE) 0.0040
Year dummies Yes Year dummies Yes
AR(1) p-value 0.0000 AR(1) p-value 0.0510
AR(2) p-value 0.8120 AR(2) p-value 0.4900
Hansen p-value 0.4220 Hansen p-value 0.3470
Banks 1,811 Banks 1,798
Countries 138 Countries 133
N 5,723 N 5,728
Note: The dependent variable in Panel A is profit efficiency (PE). The dependent variable in Panel B is Z-score 
(ZSCORE) as a proxy of insolvency risk. ZSCORE is the natural logarithm of Z-score. FINOPEN measures the 
degree of capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2008). FINFREE is the financial freedom index of Heritage 
Foundation. The variables are defined in Appendix A. All models are estimated sing the ARDL dynamic panel 
system with two lags.  L and L2 are abbreviations to denote the first and second lags of the respective variables.
Ʃ denotes the sum of these lag effects. LR denotes the long-run effect of a unit change in the causal variable on 
the dependent variable. N denotes the number of bank-year observations. GMM estimates with t-statistics (in 
parenthesis) using robust standard errors are reported. Year dummies are included in all models. Country 
dummies are accounted for in the GMM estimation. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests with a null of no serial correlation. 
All equations include GMM-type instruments (lags). Hansen is a test of over-identifying restrictions in the two-
equation system, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis (of valid instruments) at 
the 5% level.
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Table 5
Granger causality for the relationship between financial openness, risk and profit efficiency.
(1) (2)
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Profit Efficiency (PE)
PE PE
L.PE 0.5086*** L.PE 0.5115***
(10.9869) (12.2695)
L2.PE 0.1137** L2.PE 0.1046***
(2.5625) (2.7305)
L.FINOPEN 0.0002 L.FINFREE -0.0001
(0.0266) (-0.2964)
L2.FINOPEN -0.0109 L2.FINFREE -0.0006**
(-1.4482) (-2.0197)
Ʃ(FINOPEN) -0.0107*** Ʃ(FINFREE) -0.0007***
Prob > χ2 0.0000 Prob > χ2 0.0001
LR (FINOPEN→PE) -0.0283 LR (FINFREE→PE) -0.0018
L.NPL/L -0.0045*** L.NPL/L -0.0035***
(-3.7632) (-2.9845)
L2.NPL/L -0.0005 L2.NPL/L 0.0001
(-0.5151) (0.1377)
Ʃ(NPL/L) -0.0050*** Ʃ(NPL/L) -0.0036**
Prob > χ2 0.0008 Prob > χ2 0.0111
LR (NPL/L→PE) -0.0132 LR (NPL/L→PE) -0.0094
Year dummies Yes Year dummies Yes
AR(1) p-value 0.0000 AR(1) p-value 0.0000
AR(2) p-value 0.2580 AR(2) p-value 0.3190
Hansen p-value 0.1170 Hansen p-value 0.4230
Banks 2,007 Banks 1,994
Countries 140 Countries 135
N 5,978 N 5,972
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Risk (NPL/L)
NPL/L NPL/L
L.NPL/L 0.7367*** L.NPL/L 0.7398***
(2.5792) (2.6481)
L2.NPL/L -0.0619 L2.NPL/L -0.0723
(-0.3251) (-0.3887)
L.PE -4.7859*** L.PE -4.8993***
(-2.9325) (-3.0364)
L2.PE -2.2581*** L2.PE -2.2880***
(-2.7393) (-2.7318)
Ʃ(PE) -7.0440*** Ʃ(PE) -7.1873**
Prob > χ2 0.0075 Prob > χ2 0.0062
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LR (PE→NPL/L) -21.6605 LR (PE→NPL/L) -21.6159
L.FINOPEN 0.0397 L.FINFREE -0.0187**
(0.2140) (-2.2143)
L2.FINOPEN -0.1266 L2.FINFREE 0.0084
(-0.6128) (1.0588)
Ʃ(FINOPEN) -0.0869 Ʃ(FINFREE) -0.0103*
Prob > χ2 0.4772 Prob > χ2 0.0599
LR (FINOPEN→NPL/L) -0.2672 LR (FINFREE→NPL/L) -0.0310
Year dummies Yes Year dummies Yes
AR(1) p-value 0.0090 AR(1) p-value 0.0960
AR(2) p-value 0.7610 AR(2) p-value 0.7510
Hansen p-value 0.2340 Hansen p-value 0.2840
Banks 2,007 Banks 1,994
Countries 140 Countries 135
N 5,978 N 5,972
Note: The dependent variable in Panel A is profit efficiency (PE). The dependent variable in Panel B is the ratio 
of non-performing loans over total loans (NPL/L) as a proxy of credit risk. FINOPEN measures the degree of 
capital account openness (Chinn and Ito, 2008). FINFREE is the financial freedom index of Heritage 
Foundation. The variables are defined in Appendix A. All models are estimated using the ARDL dynamic panel 
system with two lags.  L and L2 are abbreviations to denote the first and second lags of the respective variables.
Ʃ denotes the sum of these lag effects. LR denotes the long-run effect of a unit change in the causal variable on 
the dependent variable. N denotes the number of bank-year observations. GMM estimates with t-statistics (in 
parenthesis) using robust standard errors are reported. Year dummies are included in all models. Country 
dummies are accounted for in the GMM estimation. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, 
respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) are Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests with a null of no serial correlation. All 
equations include GMM-type instruments (lags). Hansen is a test of over-identifying restrictions in the two-
equation system, which requires a value lower than 0.05 to reject the null hypothesis (of valid instruments) at 
the 5% level.
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Table 6
Determinants of bank mean profit inefficiency: SFA base results.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FINOPEN 0.1193*** 0.1063*** 0.1417*** 0.1419***
- Chinn-Ito (4.9630) (3.9356) (5.2821) (4.8896)
FINFREE 0.0034*** 0.0046*** 0.0058*** 0.0022***
(4.0825) (2.2069) (2.8985) (1.0549)
FOREIGN 0.0072*** 0.0036*** 0.0041*** 0.0044***
(3.5881) (4.3049) (4.6255) (4.8061)
NPL/L 0.0420*** 0.0436*** 0.0442*** 0.0431***
(12.2097) (9.4129) (9.4426) (9.4049)
ZSCORE -0.0976*** -0.1029*** -0.0978*** -0.0891***
-(3.7060) -(3.8170) -(3.6034) -(3.3607)
CAPR -0.0875*** -0.0860*** -0.0867*** -0.0751*** -0.0710*** -0.0709*** -0.0644*** -0.0566***
-(5.4108) -(4.6775) -(4.6973) -(4.2604) -(4.0527) -(3.9726) -(3.6302) -(3.1601)
SUP 0.0723*** 0.0815*** 0.0753*** 0.0718*** 0.0808*** 0.0860*** 0.0909*** 0.0821***
(6.1316) (6.3835) (5.7998) (5.7045) (6.0505) (6.2607) (6.8015) (6.1173)
PRIM -0.0225*** -0.0240*** -0.0255*** -0.0358*** -0.0374*** -0.0368*** -0.0388*** -0.0479***
-(1.1443) -(1.1991) -(1.2898) -(1.8261) -(1.8327) -(1.8098) -(1.9265) -(2.3455)
ACTR -0.1647*** -0.1738*** -0.1617*** -0.1615*** -0.1975*** -0.1978*** -0.2062*** -0.1984***
-(11.2587) -(8.6127) -(8.0800) -(8.1237) -(8.7042) -(8.4676) -(8.9537) -(8.6297)
CONC -0.0140*** -0.0134*** -0.0139*** -0.0144*** -0.0154*** -0.0149*** -0.0144*** -0.0155***
-(9.7245) -(7.4815) -(7.6159) -(7.8233) -(7.4786) -(7.4840) -(7.2497) -(7.6897)
CLAIM -0.0017*** -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0017*** -0.0014*** -0.0018*** -0.0017*** -0.0014***
-(2.4954) -(2.6388) -(2.9265) -(2.5387) -(1.8827) -(2.4613) -(2.2344) -(2.0078)
GDPGR -0.0624*** -0.0703*** -0.0675*** -0.0615*** -0.0850*** -0.0934*** -0.0947*** -0.0858***
-(8.2215) -(7.7840) -(7.4764) -(7.0861) -(8.5503) -(8.6237) -(8.9906) -(8.3049)
INFA 0.0097*** 0.0067*** 0.0100*** 0.0122*** 0.0122*** 0.0112*** 0.0081*** 0.0141***
(2.7101) (1.8585) (2.5686) (3.0568) (3.0008) (2.5552) (1.9663) (3.1432)
ASSETDIV -1.1700*** -1.2166*** -1.2091*** -1.1704*** -1.3716*** -1.4200*** -1.4162*** -1.3598***
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-(10.6821) -(8.4875) -(8.4196) -(8.3406) -(8.5578) -(8.6147) -(8.6747) -(8.4895)
SIZE -0.2978*** -0.3000*** -0.2903*** -0.2978*** -0.3607*** -0.3567*** -0.3662*** -0.3658***
-(13.0052) -(12.6093) -(12.2787) -(12.6362) -(13.6238) -(12.7590) -(13.4824) -(13.4573)
INCMDIV -0.5319*** -0.5314*** -0.5427*** -0.5444*** -0.6239*** -0.6302*** -0.6203*** -0.6417***
-(5.6467) -(5.3142) -(5.2773) -(5.4379) -(5.7055) -(5.7186) -(5.8349) -(5.8567)
DEVEL 0.2593*** 0.5159*** 0.3209*** 0.2657*** 0.0301*** 0.1448*** 0.3288*** 0.0695***
(2.5418) (5.2765) (3.1536) (2.6094) (0.3007) (1.4191) (3.4433) (0.6788)
CRISIS 0.2817*** 0.2732*** 0.2496*** 0.2659*** 0.4473*** 0.4117*** 0.4236*** 0.4319***
(2.2739) (2.1958) (1.9970) (2.1485) (3.4983) (3.2104) (3.3013) (3.3715)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-Likelihood -11,512 -11,477 -11,516 -11,459 -11,074 -11,042 -11,078 -11,021
LR-tests 2,360.3*** 2,333.2*** 2,352.2*** 2,369.8*** 2,246.4*** 2,212.7*** 2,238.5*** 2,254***
Banks 2,007 1,994 2,007 1,994 1,811 1,798 1,811 1,798
Countries 140 135 140 135 138 133 138 133
N 9,999 9,961 9,999 9,961 9,751 9,712 9,751 9,712
Note: Variables are defined in Appendix A. In the first four columns, (1), (2), (3) and (4), we use the ratio of non-performing loans over total loans (NPL/L) as a proxy for 
credit risk. In columns (5), (6), (7) and (8), we use the logarithm of Z-score (ZSCORE) as (inverse) proxy for insolvency risk. All equations include year dummies. Z-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. N denotes the number of bank-year observations. The estimated coefficients reported in this Table were obtained simultaneously with the 
parameter estimates of the stochastic frontier using the Battese and Coelli (1995) model. The estimates give the effect of the ‘‘z-environmental’’ variables on mean profit 
inefficiency. The LR-tests indicate that the overall mean (in)efficiency term has a statistically significant impact on the model. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 7
Determinants of bank mean profit inefficiency: SFA robustness.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FINOPEN 0.1235*** 0.2208*** 0.0752*** 0.1425*** 0.1505*** 0.0439*** 0.2936*** 0.0456***
- Chinn-Ito (4.5559) (4.8148) (2.0469) (4.9114) (5.1648) (0.0481) (0.8409) (1.9673)
FINFREE 0.0043*** 0.0010*** 0.0037*** 0.0057*** 0.0047*** 0.0129*** 0.0664*** 0.0075***
(2.0903) (0.3911) (1.1506) (5.7834) (2.1368) (0.0035) (2.8718) (3.5014)
FOREIGN 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0057*** 0.0047*** 0.0038*** 0.0054*** 0.0154*** 0.0013***
(4.3371) (2.8185) (4.0100) (2.0108) (4.3217) (0.0014) (2.7975) (1.6156)
FINOPEN 0.0056*** 0.0980***
- Kose (4.8483) (0.0193)
ZSCORE -0.0048*** -0.0746*** -0.1039*** -0.1707*** -0.0855*** -0.1062*** -0.0685***
-(0.1910) -(1.8818) -(2.7837) -(5.8743) -(2.4189) -(1.6244) -(2.6280)
NPL/L 0.0456***
(9.8819)
MES 0.1625***
(4.8911)
CAPR -0.0701*** -0.1452*** 0.0106 -0.0476*** -0.0576*** -0.1318*** -0.0955 -0.0134
-(4.0389) -(4.3846) (0.4547) -(2.5167) -(3.2513) -(4.4118) -(1.4565) -(0.8269)
SUP 0.0726*** 0.0242*** 0.0996*** 0.1076 0.0781*** 0.1076 0.2679*** 0.0472***
(5.8192) (1.2840) (4.9226) (7.3245) (5.8732) (5.7316) (2.8443) (4.0255)
PRIM -0.0358*** -0.0754*** -0.0250 -0.0096 -0.0390*** 0.0426 0.4203 -0.0343
-(1.8093) -(2.1736) -(0.9452) -(0.4629) -(1.9551) (1.3603) (2.6606) -(1.7473)
ACTR -0.1619*** -0.1767*** -0.2495*** -0.2380*** -0.2094*** -0.3041*** -0.7526*** -0.1003***
-(8.4123) -(5.3323) -(5.9359) -(8.6845) -(8.7207) -(6.6472) -(2.8276) -(5.8433)
CONC -0.0149*** -0.0203*** -0.0117*** -0.0174*** -0.0144*** -0.0019 -0.0679*** -0.0064***
-(8.1573) -(5.8915) -(4.2142) -(8.0223) -(7.5097) -(0.8351) -(2.6944) -(4.5132)
CLAIM -0.0015*** 0.0009 -0.0035*** -0.0039 0.0003 -0.0050 -0.0031 -0.0027***
-(2.1941) (0.6814) -(3.4367) -(4.9931) (0.3921) -(4.0313) -(1.2951) -(2.7305)
GDPGR -0.0623*** -0.0906*** -0.0682*** -0.0903*** -0.0829*** -0.0944*** -0.8513*** -0.0364***
-(7.2965) -(5.1403) -(5.2029) -(8.2853) -(8.0056) -(6.2415) -(2.9706) -(5.0406)
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INFA 0.0142*** 0.0236*** 0.0108*** 0.0174*** 0.0153*** 0.0116*** -0.2819*** 0.0100***
(3.5122) (3.6489) (1.9005) (3.8814) (3.3522) (1.7179) -(2.3183) (2.8108)
ASSETDIV -1.1863*** -1.4536*** -1.3655*** -1.4196*** -1.2761*** -1.2674*** -3.1746*** -0.6842***
-(8.5522) -(5.7590) -(5.8726) -(8.2971) -(8.3300) -(6.1300) -(2.7701) -(5.2920)
SIZE -0.3062*** -0.3759 -0.3709*** -0.3378*** -0.3631*** -0.3193 -0.4740*** -0.3561
-(12.6235) -(8.5171) -(10.6488) -(12.1902) -(13.2636) -(10.5894) -(2.6263) -(14.2232)
INCMDIV -0.5592*** -1.0198*** -0.3663*** -0.3437*** -0.6439*** -0.5432*** -3.9097*** -0.2121***
-(5.4732) -(5.4458) -(2.6271) -(3.1987) -(5.9355) -(4.0210) -(2.8491) -(2.0301)
DEVEL 0.1962*** -0.7568*** 0.4577*** -0.1888*** 0.0498*** 0.1723***
(1.9424) -(3.5068) (3.1130) -(2.2057) (0.4793) 1.0193
CRISIS 0.3392*** 0.7884*** 0.2996*** 0.5186*** 0.4065*** 0.3129*** 1.4577*** 0.2542***
(2.7394) (2.5385) (1.9551) (3.5604) (3.1982) (2.0262) (2.5402) (1.2428)
Year 
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log-
Likelihood
-10,945 -4,055.6 -6,729.3 -10,930 -11,006 -7,562.2 -3,771.3 -6,941.5
LR-tests 2,406*** 802.2*** 1,388*** 2,157.9*** 2,283.9*** 1,645.5*** 805.98*** 1,650.9***
Banks 1,798 1,089 1,676 1,798 1,798 1,374 591 1,207
Countries 133 112 130 133 133 58 31 102
N 9,712 3,879 5,833 9,712 9,712 6,373 3,313 6,399
LR-type 
Chow test
LR chi2(56) =  530.54 LR chi2(56) = 578.42
Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Variables are defined in Appendix A. Column (1) reports the estimation results while controlling for both NPL/L and ZSCORE; Column (2) reports the estimation 
results for pre-crisis sub-period 1999 to 2006, and column (3) for the post-crisis sub-period 2007 to 2011. Column (4) reports the results using Fourier Flexible (FF) 
functional form specification to derive profit inefficiency scores. Column (5) adds the de facto financial openness variable calculated by Kose et al. (2009), which is based on 
the External Wealth of Nations Database constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Column (6) replaces ZSCORE with the country-level marginal expected shortfall, 
MES (Acharya et al., 2012) as a proxy for systemic risk – this variable is scaled by a factor of 100. Columns (7) and (8) report results for the sample of banks in 31 developed 
and 102 developing countries respectively. N denotes the number of bank-year observations. All equations include year dummies. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
estimated coefficients reported in this Table were obtained simultaneously with the parameter estimates of the stochastic frontier using the Battese and Coelli (1995) model. 
The estimates give the effect of the ‘‘z-environmental’’ variables on mean profit inefficiency. The LR-tests indicate that the overall mean (in)efficiency term has a 
statistically significant impact on the model. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
